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OPENNESS AND IMPERFECT PASS-THROUGH:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MONETARY  POLICY
Claudio Soto Jorge Selaive
Banco Central de Chile New York University
Resumen
Este trabajo analiza las implicancias positivas y normativas del grado de apertura de una economía
para la transmisión de choques monetarios. Primero, presentamos nueva evidencia empírica sobre
la relación entre el grado de apertura de la economía y el coeficiente de traspaso de tipo de cambio
a precios. Luego, desarrollamos un modelo de equilibrio general donde los países no se
especializan completamente de acuerdo a sus ventajas comparativas. En este marco, mostramos
como el hecho que los países no estén completamente especializados hace que el coeficiente de
traspaso de tipo del cambio a los precios de bienes importados sea menor que uno. Mientras menos
abierto es un país –menos especializado—menor será el coeficiente de traspaso. Finalmente
mostramos que a pesar de que este hecho implica un menor grado de ajuste de la demanda a
cambios en los precios relativos ( expenditure  switching effect), la asignación que surgiría bajo
precios flexibles aún puede ser replicada por medio de una política monetaria que responda
exclusivamente a choques domésticos.
Abstract
This paper analyzes the positive and normative implications of the degree of openness of a small
economy for the transmission mechanism of monetary shocks. First, we show empirical evidence
on the direct relationship between openness and the degree of exchange rate pass-through. Then, we
develop a general equilibrium model where countries do not fully specialize according to their
comparative advantages. With this framework we show that incomplete specialization makes the
pass-through from exchange rate to import prices imperfect. The less open is the country --the less
specialized- the lower is the pass-through from exchange rate to import prices. Despite the fact that
the pass-through is incomplete and the expenditure switching effect is diminished, the flexible price
allocation can still be reached with an inward-oriented monetary policy.
___________________
We are grateful to Pierpaolo Benigno for his invaluable advice. We would also like to thank the participants at
the Internal Seminar at NYU and LACEA Conference. All remaining errors are, of course, ours.
E-mails: csotog@bcentral.cl; js899@nyu.edu.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The objective of this paper is to analyze the positive and normative implica-
tions of openness for the transmission mechanism of monetary shocks. Our
concept of openness diﬀers from the standard assumption in macro models
in the New Open Macroeconomics (NOM) tradition and it is more related
to the trade literature. We say that an economy is completely open when it
is completely specialized in the production of goods for which it has com-
parative advantages. On the contrary, a country is not completely open
if certain amount of resources are allocated in the production of goods for
which it has no comparative advantages. The degree of openness depends
on how specialized is the country.1
We develop a general equilibrium monetary model with oligopolistic com-
petition, where foreign ﬁrms interact strategically with domestic ﬁrms to de-
termine the equilibrium price of the imported good. In this framework, we
show that incomplete specialization breaks down the link between exchange
rate and import prices. In this oligopolistic environment, the existence of
ﬁrms that substitute imports and compete strategically with foreign pro-
ducers makes domestic marginal cost relevant in the determination of equi-
librium import prices. Since domestic marginal costs are not aﬀected by the
exchange rate, then the impact of this variable on the equilibrium import
prices is dampened. In other words, the pass-through from exchange to
import prices is not perfect. Moreover, the degree of openness determines
the degree of pass-through. The less open is the country, the lower is the
pass-through from exchange rate to import prices. This has important im-
plications for the eﬀect of monetary shocks on terms of trade, and the real
exchange rate. In particular, if the country is not completely open, accord-
ing our deﬁnition of openness, then purchasing power parity (PPP) does
not longer holds. At the same time, the degree of openness determines the
response of the real exchange rate to monetary shocks, and the sign of the
correlation between the terms of trade and the exchange rate.
Recent debate on optimal monetary policy in open economies has em-
phasized the role of limited exchange rate pass-through in deﬁning the right
response of monetary policy to foreign shocks. Models that assume perfect
pass-through — producer currency price (PCP) models — show that inward
looking policies sustain the ﬂexible price allocation and are eﬃcient. On
the other hand, models where ﬁrms discriminate across markets — price to
market (PTM) models — and where the pass-through is limited, show that
1We may think that tariﬀs or other trade barriers prevent complete specialization.
1an optimal policy should also react to foreign shocks (Corsetti and Pesenti,
2001a; Devereux and Engel, 2000). In this literature, the optimal monetary
policy implies a reduced volatility of the exchange rate.
K e yt ot h er e s u l t si nt h eP T Ml i t e r ature is the nature of the limited
pass-through from exchange rate into import goods prices. Imperfect pass-
through in these models is generated by assuming that the local currency
price of import goods is ﬁxed. Then, there is no expenditure switching eﬀect.
In this context, a ﬂexible exchange rate regime would only introduce noise
in the economy, and the ﬂexible price allocation would not be reached by
means of monetary policy.
In our case, however, the nature of the imperfect exchange rate pass-
through phenomenon is not linked to the source of nominal rigidity in the
economy. Because of that, a policy that reacts only to domestic shock is able
to replicate the ﬂexible price allocation. Moreover, under such a policy the
nominal exchange rate will ﬂuctuate with domestic and foreign real shocks.
Our decentralized equilibrium is not Pareto Optimal due to a set of dis-
tortions. First, goods markets are not competitive since there is oligopolistic
competition with a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms. Second, workers have monopoly
power and set wages above their marginal disutility. Third, the fact that
countries do not fully specialize according to their comparative advantages
also introduces a distortion into the model. Thus, potentially there exist in-
centives for the monetary authority in going beyond replicating the ﬂexible
price allocation. We show that when the economy is completely closed the
Central Bank may have incentives to deviates from policy rules. However,
we also show that those incentives are minimized for intermediate degrees
of openness.
Most of the NOM literature have assumed that countries completely
specialize in the production of goods. Usually, in these models the degree
of openness is measured by the share of foreign goods in the speciﬁcation of
the consumption bundle2. In other words, countries with diﬀerent degrees of
openness consume diﬀerent consumption bundles. In our model, however,
households in each country consume exactly the same bundle. Openness
aﬀects the production sector of the economy, but not preferences.
The imperfect pass-through from exchange rate to import prices is a ro-
bust stylized fact (see Engel C. (2001) for a survey). The ﬁrst papers that
formally introduced imperfect pass-through assumed that ﬁrms engage in
PTM and face costly price adjustments (Devereaux and Engel, 1998). Dy-
namic version of these models have been developed by Monacelli (1999), and
2See Lane P. (2001) for a complete survey of this literature.
2Smets and Wouters (2002). Recently, Corsetti and Dedola (2001), following
evidence presented by Burnstein, Neves and Rebelo (2000), have developed
a model where distribution costs incurred in the delivery of tradable goods
generate a gap between the consumer price of import goods and the pro-
ducer price. Since distribution cost are not aﬀected by the exchange rate,
ﬂuctuations in this variable are only partially trespassed into the consumer
price. As a result, the exchange rate pass-through is incomplete.
The hypothesis that market structure and local competition may aﬀect
the degree of pass-through has its roots in the pioneer work by Dornbush
(1987). In the context of NOM models, Tille (2001) relaxes the assumption
of complete international sectorial specialization as in our model. However,
in his setup countries do not fully specialize in a given type of good but
t h ed os p e c i a l i z ei np a r t i c u l a rb r a n d s .T h e r e f o r et h eL O Pr e m a i n sv a l i da t
brands level.
The structure of the paper is the following: In section 2 we present some
new evidence about the relationship between openness and the degree of
pass-through. In section 3 we lay down the model. In sections 4 and 5
we analyze some partial equilibrium implications of the model. Section 6
characterizes the ﬂexible price equilibrium of this economy. In section 7 we
discuss diﬀerent monetary regimes and analyze the short run implication of
small monetary shocks. Finally, in section 8 we conclude.
2 Openness and Pass-through: New Evidence
In this section we present new evidence on the relationship between openness
and exchange rate pass-through.
Micro-level studies have shown the importance of market structure and
the degree of openness in determining the pass-through from exchange rate
into import prices (see Kettner and Goldberg, 1997 for a survey). Studies
that utilize aggregate data are more scarce and mainly focus on the rela-
tionship between nominal devaluation and domestic inﬂation (Golfajn and
Werlang, 2001; De Gregorio, 2000). One of the few exceptions is the recent
work by Campa and Goldberg (2002) which speciﬁcally focus on the eﬀect
of the exchange rate on aggregate import prices. Our empirical approach
follows closely these authors.
32.1 Pass-through elasticity
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In general, macro-models have assumed that the second term on the
RHS of this expression is zero. In other words, it has been assumed that the
exporter keeps P
x,j
t ﬁxed in response to exchange rate ﬂuctuations. This case
corresponds to a case were the exchange rate pass-through is one. However,
what micro evidence shows is that P
x,j
t also ﬂuctuates with the exchange
rate. More precisely, it has been shown that in general P
x,j
t falls with E
j
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where µj (·) represents the markup and Cj (·) is the marginal cost. In prin-





t summarize all other variables that aﬀect µj and Cj,
respectively.
There are diﬀerent reasons why the exchange rate inﬂuences the local-
currency export price. The marginal cost could be aﬀected by the exchange
rate because of the existence of imported inputs. The markup, on the other
hand, may be aﬀected by the exchange rate because of strategic reasons
concerning the maximization problem faced by the ﬁrm. In particular, if
the optimal markup depends on the market share of the ﬁrm and this, in
turn, depends on the relative price of good j, then the exchange rate would
aﬀect the markup. This is our hypothesis.
If we consider these eﬀects of the exchange rate on the markup and the
marginal cost, then the pass-through elasticity would be given by
γj =1+ωj + ηj ≤ 1
3We assume that good j is imported from a single country. If the good is imported
from many diﬀerent countries then P
x,j
t would be a price index and E
j
t would be the price
of a baskett of currencies.
4where ωj ≤ 0 is the exporters’ markup elasticity with respect to the exchange
rate and ηj ≤ 0 is the elasticity of the marginal cost with respect to the
exchange rate.
2.2 Empirical evidence
Our approach follows closely the empirical approach utilized recently by
Campa and Goldberg (2002). In the ﬁrst place we estimate short run pass-
through elasticities for a set of countries. Then, we regress the pass-through
estimates against a set of macro variables. Our main objective is to eval-
uate the importance of openness in aﬀecting the degree of pass-through.
Therefore, we explicitly incorporate diﬀerent measures of openness as re-
gressors. Our sample consist of quarterly data for 35 countries, including
not only industrial countries but also developing countries from Africa, Asia
and Latin-America.
The basic speciﬁcation for the equation that characterizes the price of
i m p o r tg o o d si st h ef o l l o w i n g :
pm
t = γet + εt (1)
where pm
t and et are the natural logarithm of the import price and the
nominal exchange rate.4
The data we utilize is the following: For import prices we consider the
unitary value of import from the IFS (series 75..dzf ), expressed in domestic
currency. The exchange rate is the nominal eﬀective exchange rate, also
from the IFS (series nec). The data is quarterly for diﬀerent periods be-
tween 1975:1 and 2001:4. We consider only countries for which at least 25
observations were available during this period. After applying this criterion
a sample of 35 countries remained in the data set.
Equation (1) is estimated in ﬁrst diﬀerences with the addition of lagged
exchange rate and import price to allow for gradual adjustment and to
4Campa and Goldberg criticize this speciﬁcation. They argue that a correct speciﬁca-
tion should include, additionally, controls to capture exporters’ costs associated with local
inputs, and demand conditions in the destination market -others than the ones related
with the exchange rate. Unfortunately the data required to include such controls is not
readily available but only for a small sample of countries (the 25 industrilized countries
that Campa and Goldberg include in their regressions). Therefore, in order to increase
the sample of countries we did not include such additional controls.
Under our speciﬁcation the results would be biased only in the case that the cost of
local inputs and demand conditions in the destination market were correlated with the
exchange rate. However, we think that there are good reasons to assume that the nominal
eﬀe c t i v ee x c h a n g er a t ei sn o tc o r r e l a t e dw i t ht h e s ev a r i a b l e s .
5control for seasonality:5
∆pm







t−i + υt (2)
Notice that in (2) the pass-through elasticity is constant. Some authors
claimed that this elasticity has changed over time (Taylor, 2000) or that it
is correlated with the business cycle. In our approach, thus, γ corresponds
to the average pass-through elasticity for the all period.
The results of the pass-through estimation for 35 countries are summa-
rized in table 1. For comparison, we also present the estimates in Campa
and Goldberg.
For most of the countries, both the hypothesis of zero pass-through
(LCP) and perfect pass-through (PCP) can be rejected with 95% conﬁdence.
The hypothesis of zero pass-through is rejected for 28 of the 35 countries.
At the same time, for only 2 cases the full pass-through hypothesis could
not be rejected.
The average pass-through elasticity for our sample of countries is 0.5
with a standard deviation of 0.27.
Since we are interested in the relationship between openness and pass-
through through its eﬀect of the mark-up exposure to exchange ﬂuctuation,
ideally we would like to have an estimate of ω. However, it is clear from
equation (1) that it is not possible to identify ω and η separately.
We could obtain a very rough idea of the range of values of η based on
imported input share data. Campa and Goldberg (1997) computed imported
input shares for 4 industrialized countries (US, UK, Canada and Japan).
Their ﬁgures range from 0.041 (Japan, 1993) up to 0.217 (UK, 1993). Base
on this data we may claim that any value of γ below 0.8 would correspond
to ω<0.6
5Co-integration test were performed and the null of no cointegration could not be
rejected for all countries.
6Notice that in order to properly identify η for a particular countr i we must realy
on data about the cost structure of all countries from which that particular country im-
ports, including not only domestic labor cost (as in Campa and Goldberg, 2002) but also
considering imported input from country i.
6Table 1
Short-run exchange rate pass-through into import price
Country b γC G a CGb Country b γC G a CGb
Australia 0.62+,∗ 0.55 0.55 Malasya -0.04∗ n.a. n.a.
Belgium 0.70+,∗ 0.16 0.66 Morocco 0.60 n.a. n.a.
Canada 0.66+,∗ 0.65 0.70 Norway 0.52+,∗ 0.51 0.38
Chile 0.53+,∗ n.a. n.a. Netherlands 0.90+,∗ 0.75 0.74
Colombia 0.28+,∗ n.a. n.a. New Zealand 0.66+,∗ 0.47 0.58
C. Ivoire 0.53∗ n.a. n.a. Pakistan -0.10∗ n.a. n.a.
Cyprus 0.02 n.a. n.a. Poland 0.51+,∗ 0.50 0.50
Denmark 0.91+,∗ 0.56 0.70 Portugal 0.53+,∗ 0.60 0.56
Finland 0.41+,∗ 0.69 0.59 S. Africa 0.20+,∗ n.a. n.a.
France 0.61+,∗ 0.53 0.56 Spain 0.72+,∗ 0.66 0.73
Germany 0.57+,∗ 0.59 0.50 Sweden 0.47+,∗ 0.67 0.68
Greece 0.70+,∗ 0.40 0.30 Switzerland 0.74+,∗ 0.67 0.60
Hungary 0.58+,∗ 0.58 0.46 T. Tobago 0.06 n.a. n.a.
Ireland 0.73+,∗ 0.79 0.80 Tunisia 0.11∗ n.a. n.a.
Israel 0.78+,∗ n.a n.a. U. K. 0.37+,∗ 0.39 0.31
Italy 0.71+,∗ 0.67 0.75 U. S. 0.17+,∗ 0.26 0.18
Japan 0.82+,∗ 0.88 0.84 Venezuela 0.44+,∗ n.a. n.a.
Malawi 0.55∗ n.a. n.a.
Note: +,∗ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero or one at 5 percent level
CGa: Campa and Goldberg estimates (table 1 main text)
CGa Campa and Goldberg estimates (table 1 appendix)
To address the eﬀect of openness on the degree of pass-through we run
second stage cross-section regressions over the pass-through coeﬃcients es-
timated before. The speciﬁcation is the following:
b γi = c + axi +  i (3)
where xi is a vector containing exogenous variables. This vector includes,
as regressors, country-speciﬁci n ﬂation, inﬂation volatility, and nominal ex-
change rate volatility. We consider three diﬀerent measures of openness: (i)
OPEN, which corresponds to the imports/GDP ratio, constructed utilizing
data from the IFS; (ii) DUTIES, which measures import duties as a percent-
age of imports, from the WDI (based on data from the GFS), and ﬁnally
(iii) TARIFF, which corresponds to the own-import weighted tariﬀ rates
7on intermediate inputs and capital goods, from Barro and Lee (based on
UNCTAD data).7 Also, as Campa and Goldberg, we include real GDP as a
proxy for country size. Like the openness, this measure is meant to capture
the extent to which local competitors are large in number relative to foreign
ﬁrms, which could aﬀect the degree of pass-through.
The regressions use weighted least squares, where the weights are the
inverse of the standard error of the estimated pass-through. Under this
approach noisy estimates from the ﬁrst stage receive less weight in the second
stage regression.




C0 . 3 7 ∗ 0.20∗ 0.32∗ 0.18∗ 0.57∗ 0.44∗ 0.54∗ 0.38∗
0.10 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.10
OPEN 0.58 0.60∗ 0.61 0.53
0.31 0.30 0.32 0.31
DUTIES -1.39 -1.30∗ -1.64∗ -1.49∗
0.84 0.69 0.70 0.68
inﬂ -0.00 -0.00
0.00 0.00
vol. inﬂ. 0.20 0.21 0.17 0.21
0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
vol. ee 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.11
0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
R2 adj. 0.59 0.61 0.58 0.61 0.58 0.61 0.60 0.63
# o b s . 3 53 53 53 53 53 5 3 5 3 5
Note: *signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at 5% level
7See Edwards (1998) for a discussion on diﬀerent measures of openness and their draw-
backs.
8Table 2 (cont.)
9 1 01 11 21 31 41 51 6
C0 . 5 1 ∗ 0.46∗ 0.50∗ 0.49∗ 0.61∗ 0.37∗ 0.51∗ 0.34∗
0.06 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.09
TARIFF -1.38∗ -0.74∗ -1.26∗ -1.41∗
0.45 0.34 0.36 0.44
RGDP -0.10∗ -0.08∗ -0.07∗ -0.08∗
0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
inﬂ 0.01 -0.01∗
0.01 0.00
vol. inﬂ. 0.14 0.16 0.22∗ 0.24∗
0.12 0.12 0.10 0.11
vol. ee 0.26 0.28∗ 0.02 0.05
0.14 0.14 0.07 0.07
R2 adj. 0.61 0.59 0.63 0.64 0.62 0.63 0.58 0.62
# o b s .2 92 92 92 93 53 53 53 5
Note: *signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at 5 percent level
For all diﬀerent speciﬁcations our alternative measures of openness are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In all cases, more openness (lower import
duties, lower tariﬀs) implies a higher pass-through elasticity More impor-
tantly, of all variables meant to capture openness the variable TARIFF is
the one that presents the highest t-test. This variable measures trade dis-
tortions that may exist to protect sector in which import substitution exists.
The inﬂation rate is signiﬁcant only when real GDP is included. Inﬂation
volatility, on the other hand, seems to be more important in aﬀecting the
pass-through. Real GDP is statistically signiﬁcant and present the expected
sign. Contrary to the results of Campa and Goldberg, exchange rate volatil-
ity does not aﬀect in a statistically signiﬁcant way the degree of pass-through
in our estimates.
2.3 Further evidence
Other evidence conﬁrm the positive relationship between the degree of open-
ness of the economy and the exchange rate pass-through into both the price
of import goods and inﬂation.
For a group of industrialized countries McCarthy (2000) estimate VARs
9and concludes that the exchange rate pass-through to domestic inﬂation is
larger in countries with larger import shares. Campa and Gonzalez (2002)
focus on the diﬀerences in exchange rate pass-through to import prices in
the Euro area. They conclude that those diﬀerences are primarily explained
by diﬀerences in the degree of openness to non-euro countries.
A more comprehensive study by Goldfajn and Wagner (2001) shows that
openness has a positive impact on the estimated coeﬃcient of the exchange
rate in an inﬂation regression for a panel of countries.
Indirect evidence based on stock markets is presented by Bodnar and
Gentry (1993) and Friberg and Nydahl (1999). Bodnar and Gentry ﬁnd
that the value of ﬁrms in more open economies is more inﬂuenced by the
exchange rate than in more closed economies. Similarly, Friberg and Nydahl
ﬁnd a positive and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between exchange
rate exposure and openness for the OECD countries.
3 The Model
There are two countries: Domestic country (d)a n dForeign country (f).
Each country is populated by a large number of consumers with identical
preferences, indexed by j ∈ [0,1]. Consumers in each country live inﬁnitely
and consume two types of traded goods: a and b.
Countries are incompletely specialized in the production of one of the
two traded goods. The Domestic country has comparative advantages in
good a and produces this type of good for both domestic consumption and
exports. However, this country also produces some amount of good b for
local consumption. The Foreign country, on the other hand, produces good
b for local consumption and exports, and it also produces a certain amount
of good a.8
The degree of openness of each country is measured by the fraction of
foreign (domestic) ﬁrms selling the import good. The degree of openness
of the Domestic country is given by the fraction 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 of ﬁrms selling
good b that are foreign. Analogously, the degree of openness of the Foreign
country in given by the fraction 0 ≤ γ∗ ≤ 1 of ﬁrms selling good a that are
domestic ﬁrms.
8Notice that this is a very extreme form of import substitution: Countries produce
domestically exactly the same good they import. Alternatively, we could assume that
countries produce close substitutes of the goods they import. In either case, the key
element is whether or not there is strategic interaction between domestic and foreign ﬁrms.
As we will see below, our extreme assumption allows us to obtain close form solutions for
the equilibrium prices.
10When γ =0the Domestic country does not import from the Foreign
economy and produces both types of goods. This corresponds to a closed
economy case. If γ =1then the domestic economy is completely specialized
in the production of good a. In this case we will say that the economy is
completely open. This case corresponds to most of the models in the NOM
literature where a Home country specializes in the production of home goods.
3.1 Household’s Problem
There is a continuum of households indexed in the interval [0,1].H o u s e h o l d























t represents labor eﬀort, M
j
t /Pt are real balances, ζt is a withe noise
stochastic process with mean 1 that corresponds to a shock to labor eﬀort
disutility, and C
j
t is a consumption index that includes two types of traded






































In this economy, asset markets are complete: There are complete, contin-
gent one-period bonds denominated in the domestic currency. Let B
j
t(st+1)
denote the domestic consumer’s holding of a bond purchased in period t
with payoﬀs contingent in some particular state st+1 at t +1 . One unit of
this bond pays one unit of the home currency in period t+1if the particular
state st+1 occurs and 0 otherwise. Let q(st+1 | st) denote the price of one
unit of that bond in period t and history st.H o u s e h o l dj maximize utility





















































t are net transfers from the government, W
j
t is the nominal wage
rate, and Π
j
t are proﬁts received from ﬁrms.















t dj =0 (7)
3.2 Consumer Optimization
From the ﬁrst order conditions for the consumers problem for each possible



























where Et is the expectation operator conditional on the information set at
time t and it+1 is the risk free interest rate. Expression (8) is the Euler
equation. Equation (9) corresponds to the money demand. It shows that at
the optimum the marginal rate of substitution between real money balances
and consumption must equate the marginal cost of holding an extra unit of
real balances one period.




st+1 q(st+1 | st)
.
It is easy to show that with complete asset market there is perfect risk
sharing between domestic and foreign consumption. In other words, the ratio
between marginal utilities of consumption of both countries is proportional









where the real exchange rate is deﬁned as et =
EtP∗
t
Pt ,a n dw h e r eω is just a
constant. From (10), we can see that relative consumption across countries
is proportional to the real exchange rate. If the law of one price (LOP)
holds, then the previous condition implies that there is full risk sharing
across countries. However, as we will see below in our model LOP does not
hold, and there is no full risk sharing.
123.3 Technology and Labor Demand
We can distinguish three diﬀerent types of domestic ﬁr m s . O n et y p eo f
ﬁrms produce good a only for the domestic market; A second type of ﬁrms
produces this type of good to export to the foreign country; Finally a third
group of ﬁrms produce good b for the domestic market. This last group of
ﬁrms substitute imports and compete with foreign producers that also sell
good b domestically.
Let Yi,t(m) denote total output of good type i produced by a domestic
ﬁrm selling to market m,f o ri = a,b and m = d,f.T h e ﬁrm combines
diﬀerentiated labor inputs from all domestic households to produce output.














i,t(m) represents labor input from household j. Parameter φ is the
elasticity of substitution among diﬀerent types of labor inputs, which we
assume is the same across sectors and across countries, and αi is a non-
stochastic productivity parameter idiosyncratic to sector i.
Given the previous technology, cost minimization by the ﬁrm yields the













where Wt(j) is the price of household’s j labor and where the wage index,










Let Ni,m denote the number of domestic ﬁrms producing good i and
selling to market m. The total demand for the labor input supplied by












































i,m denotes the number of foreign ﬁrms producing good i and selling
to market m,a n dα∗
i is a non-stochastic productivity parameter idiosyncratic
to sector i in the foreign country.
We assume that the Domestic country has comparative advantages over
the Foreign country in the production of good a. In other words, we assume









Price stickiness is induced in the model by assuming that workers and ﬁrms
agree on the nominal wage before the realization of any shock. Domestic
household j chooses an optimal wage rate by maximizing (4) subject to the
budget constraint (6) and total labor demand (12). The ﬁrst order condition























Because of workers monopoly power, the wage rate is set with a markup
ΦW over the expected utility cost of labor eﬀort, expressed in units of do-
mestic currency. Having set wage rate optimally workers stand ready to
provide any amount of labor to ﬁrms at the ongoing rate, as long as the real
wage is above the marginal disutility of labor. We restrict the size of shocks
such that this is always the case.
3.5 Firms’ optimization
In each market a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms compete in an oligopolistic fashion.
We assume that competition among ﬁrms is Cournot.9 Each period a ﬁrm
must decide how much to produce of a certain good subject to the demand
for that good, taking as given the production of all other competitors.
9This assumption is not fundamental for our results. It allows us to obtain close form
solutions for the equilibrium prices. Assuming other forms of oligopolistic competition
with domestic ﬁrms interacting strategically with foreign ﬁrms would not change our
main results.
14We also assume that a particular ﬁrm produces only one type of good
for one particular market. Therefore, ﬁrms producing good a for domestic
consumption are diﬀerent than ﬁrms exporting this good abroad.
Let Yi,t(d) denote the quantity produced by a domestic ﬁrm selling good
i in the domestic market (i = a,b). The problem for this ﬁrm is to choose







subject to the domestic demand for good i (5).10 From the ﬁrst order








This expression deﬁnes the reaction function of the ﬁrm. For a given
price, this reaction function implies a negative relationship between the
market share of the ﬁrm and its marginal cost. In other words, the less
competitive is the ﬁrm the lower is its market share.
Ad o m e s t i cﬁrm that exports good a chooses Ya,t(f) in order to maximize







subject to the foreign demand for the good and taking as given output from











T os o l v ef o rt h ee q u i l i b r i u mp r i c ei ne a c hm a r k e tw el o o kf o rt h eﬁxed
point of each one of the reaction functions obtained from the ﬁrst order
conditions.
10Here we use the fact that in a symmetric equilibrium, households will set optimally
the same wage and W
j
t = Wt. In this case, the quantity demanded of each type of labor
by a ﬁrm is the same, li,t(j,m)=li,t(m)=Yi,t(m)/αi,t.
153.6 Market Clearing
For simplicity we assume that a number N>1 of ﬁrms sell good a in the
domestic country and the same number N of ﬁrms sell good b. Analogously,
the number of ﬁrms that sells goods a and b in the foreign economy is N∗.11.
Notice that by assumption domestic ﬁrms producing good b are less
productive than foreign’s. In order to support an equilibrium with ﬁrms
with productivity coexisting we must assume that the entry cost is also
diﬀerentiated. In particular, we have to assume that foreign ﬁrms that
export good b must pay a higher entry cost than domestic producers.12
Goods market equilibrium: Since the Domestic country is specialized
in the production of good a,a l lﬁrms selling that good locally are domestic
ﬁrms. Then, we have that Na,d = N. The market clearing condition implies:
Ca,t = NYa,t(d).
For the case of good b af r a c t i o nγ of the N ﬁrms selling this good
domestically are foreign ﬁrms. The remaining (1 − γ)N ﬁrms are domestic.
In terms of our previous notation, we have that N∗
b,d = γN and Nb,d =
(1 − γ)N. The market clearing condition in this case is the following,
Cb,t =
¡




Analogously, market clearing condition for goods a and b in the foreign









b,t = N∗Y ∗
b,t(f)
11Clearly, in order to justify a ﬁnite number of ﬁr m si ne a c hm a r k e tw ew o u l dn e e dt o
introduce an entry costs.
12T h e r ei sw i d ee v i d e n c et h a tﬁrms wishing to export not only face variable costs , but
also face some ﬁxed costs that do not vary with export volume (see Roberts and Tybout
(1997)). For example, a ﬁrm must inform foreign buyers about its product and learn
about the foreign market. It must then research the foreign regulatory environment and
adapt its product to ensure that it conforms to foreign standards. An exporting ﬁrm
must also set up new distribution channels in the foreign country and conform to all the
shipping rules speciﬁed by the foreign customs agency. Although some of these costs can
not be avoided, others are often manipulated by governments in order to erect non-tariﬀ
barriers to trade. Regardless of their origin, these costs are most appropriately modeled
as independent of the ﬁrm’s export volume decision.
16Labor market equilibrium. In a symmetric equilibrium all households
set optimally the same wage rate Wt. Then, from expression (12) and from
the assumption that workers satisfy demand at the ongoing wage rate we

























where we have replaced in (12) the corresponding number of ﬁrms producing
for each market.
3.7 Monetary Policy
We assume that the government aﬀects the stock of monetary assets by
controlling the short term interest rate it. In order to characterize monetary










Given the path µt there is a corresponding sequence for the nominal
interest rate. From the Euler equation, we can also see that in equilib-
rium µt = PtCt satisﬁes the monetary rule. In other words, the monetary
authority controls nominal expenditure.
3.8 Equilibrium





b,t, la,t, lb,t, l∗
a,t, l∗
b,t} such that: (i) Consumer allocations
solve the consumer’s problem; (ii) the price of ﬁnal goods solve the ﬁrm’s
maximization problem; (iii) market clearing condition hold; and (iv) the
money supply process and transfers satisfy (7) and (19).
From the ﬁrst order condition for the ﬁrms and the goods market clearing

















17where ΦN ≡ N
N−1 reﬂects the distortion created by the oligopolistic compe-
tition.

























T h ee q u i l i b r i u mp r i c ei ne a c hm a r k e td e p e n d so nt h ed e g r e eo fc o m p e -
tition and the average marginal cost of the ﬁrms participating in it. The
degree of competition is determined by the total number of ﬁrms selling each
type of goods on each market. The larger is the number of ﬁrms the more
competitive is the market and the lower is the bridge between the average
marginal cost and the price.
Since all ﬁrms selling good a in the Domestic country are alike, the
average marginal cost is just the marginal cost of the representative ﬁrm.
The average marginal cost in the domestic market for good b, in turn, is a
linear combination of domestic and foreign costs with a weight given by the
fraction of each type of ﬁrms in the market. If the country is completely open
(γ =1 ) then the price of import goods is just a function of the marginal
cost of foreign producers, expressed in domestic currency. In this case,
ﬂuctuations in the nominal exchange rate are fully transmitted to the price
of the good. In other words, the model collapses to a standard PCP model
(Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1998, 2000)) were good a would correspond to a Home
good and good b to a Foreign good.
If the country is partially open (γ<1) then the marginal cost of domestic
ﬁrms also inﬂuences the price of the import good. In this case, exchange
rate ﬂuctuations are not fully transmitted to the price. We will come back
to this point when discussing the incomplete pass-through from exchange
rate to import price.
Table 3 presents all equations that characterize the short-run (sticky
wages) equilibrium in this economy. Unfortunately, it is not possible to
obtain a closed-form solution for consumption and labor. In section 4 and
5 we discuss some partial equilibrium implications of the model. In section
6 below we perform some monetary policy analysis. .
184 Markups and Market Shares
Before analyzing the eﬀect of nominal shocks on the real exchange rate and
the terms of trade, it is illustrating to characterize the equilibrium markups
and market shares for diﬀerent types of ﬁrms.
Markups for each one of the three types of ﬁrms operating in the domestic


































The markup for ﬁrms selling a domestically is constant and depends only
on the degree of competition in the market. For the case of the two types
of ﬁrms selling b domestically the markup is a function of the exchange rate
and the relative unitary labor cost (ulc).
Keeping everything else constant, a nominal depreciation raises the markup
for a domestic ﬁrm that substitute imports, and reduces the markup of a
foreign ﬁrm selling b domestically. This result does not hinge on changes
in individual ﬁrm’s cost schedules (wages are constant in the short run),
but the result of the strategic interaction of ﬁrms that are aﬀected in an
asymmetric way by changes in the exchange rate.





















Thus, a nominal devaluation will increase the market share of domestic
ﬁrm and reduce the participation of foreign companies in market b. Then,
expansive policies will have a double eﬀect on employment in this sector. On
the one hand, such policy raises overall demand in general, and the demand
for good b in particular. By itself this eﬀect increases labor in sector b.B u t
at the same time, domestic ﬁrms expand their participation in the market,
which reinforces the increase in labor demand in that sector.
19Notice that without any further restriction it could be possible that for
certain realizations of the shocks the market share on one of these ﬁrms
falls below zero. To avoid this situation we impose certain restrictions on
the shocks and the parameters of the model. In particular, we assume that










For a given ratio of nominal wages, if the domestic market is very com-
petitive (large N) then the diﬀerence between domestic productivity and
foreign productivity in sector b can not be to large (αb/α∗
b not to low)
Analogously, we impose the following restriction on the productivity










With these two restrictions it is easy to show that market shares of both
types of ﬁrms are a decreasing function of γ. More openness implies that
both the fraction of foreign ﬁrms in the domestic market for good b and the
fraction of domestic ﬁrms in the foreign market for good a, increase. There-
fore, existing ﬁrms in either market must compete with more productive
ﬁrms, and their market shares must fall.
5 Imperfect Pass-Through, Real Exchange Rate
and Terms of Trade Under Sticky Wages
The main feature of the model is the existence of market segmentation.
Thus, two foreign ﬁrms with the same cost structure charge diﬀerent prices
depending on where they sell -domestic or foreign market. The only case
where the price of a good is the same in both countries is when domestic
cost and foreign cost are equal and the number of ﬁrms operating in each





















A second feature of this model with incomplete specialization is the
existence of an incomplete pass-through from the nominal exchange rate
20to the price of import goods. In the domestic country, the pass-through

















Is easy to see that the pass-through will be complete only when γ is
one. On the other hand, as long as there is some participation of domestic
producers in sector b the pass-through will be lower than one. The key
element explaining this result is the fact that domestic wages, which are nor
aﬀected by the exchange rate, are relevant in determining the equilibrium
import price.
The pass-through elasticity in our model with oligopolistic competition
is remarkably similar to the one obtained by Corsetti and Dedola (2002) in a
setup with distribution costs. In their case, the existence of such costs -that
depend on the price of non-traded good and are not aﬀected by the exchange
rate- precludes foreign ﬁrms from trespassing completely all changes in their
cost.
As in Corsetti and Deldola our pass-through elasticity also depends on
the relative unitary labor cost. The higher is the domestic unitary labor
cost relative to foreign’ ucl the lower is the pass-through. For a given γ,
high domestic ulc relative to foreign ulc implies that domestic cost are more
important in the determination of the equilibrium price in this sector. Thus,
exchange rate ﬂuctuations will have a lower impact.
Notice that in general, violations of the relative LOP not necessarily
imply incomplete pass-through. Models with shipping cost, for example,
exhibit departures from the LOP but a perfect pass-through from exchange
rate to import prices.
The imperfect pass-through from exchange rate to import prices will
have important consequences on both the real exchange rate and the terms
of trade.





























From the previous deﬁnition it is easy to show that under sticky wages,
and for γ and γ∗ diﬀerent than one, a nominal depreciation unambiguously
depreciates the real exchange rate.
21It is important to note here that all ﬂuctuations in the real exchange
rate corresponds to ﬂuctuations in the relative price of traded goods (as
compared with ﬂuctuations arising from changes in the relative price of non
traded goods). Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2001) present evidence that
ﬂuctuations in the price of non-traded goods across countries account for
none of the volatility of the real exchange rate. This evidence is consistent
with our formulation for the real exchange rate. In general, this will be also
true for any model where the law of one price does not hold.
If both countries are completely open (γ = γ∗ =1 ) then nominal shocks
have no eﬀect since the real exchange rate is constant. On the other hand,
as γ and γ∗ approach to 0 nominal shocks tend to be fully transmitted into
the RER. Hence, for a given degree of openness abroad, the more closed
and less specialized is the domestic economy, the more sensible is the real
exchange rate to nominal exchange rate ﬂuctuations. As γ decreases, the
domestic price level tends to be isolated from foreign nominal shocks. In
this case, ﬂuctuations in the nominal exchange rate are not compensated
by movement in Pt. Instead, they are translated into real exchange rate
ﬂuctuations.
In this context, if the monetary authority wants to reduce the real ex-
change volatility, it will be more prone to intervene and reduce the nominal
v a r i a b i l i t yi nr e l a t i v e l yc l o s e da n do p e ne c o n o m i e s( w i t hah i g hγ but small
γ∗). Firms from small economies will tend to be marginal in the determi-
nation of foreign prices. In other words, we might think of small economies
as ones facing low γ∗. This result is consistent with empirical evidence pre-
sented by Hau (1999) who ﬁnd that the volatility of the real exchange rate
is negatively correlated with the degree of openness measured by the ratio
of imports to GDP.
Lets consider the impact of nominal exchange rate ﬂuctuations on the
terms of trade. Following the convention, terms of trade (TOTt)a r ed e ﬁned
































According to this deﬁnition, a fall in TOTt corresponds to an improve-
ment in the terms of trade. In contrast with the real exchange rate, here a
nominal devaluation has an ambiguous eﬀect. In fact, the response of the
terms of trade will depend on the degree of openness in both economies.










then a nominal depreciation wors-
ens the terms of trade.
If γ is large enough, then the price of the imported good in the domestic
country is largely determined by foreign producers. At the same time, if γ∗
large then the foreign currency price of domestic exports is determined by
domestic costs. In this context, a nominal devaluation increases the domes-
tic currency price of import goods without aﬀecting the domestic currency
price of exports. However, if γ is smaller than the threshold deﬁn e di nt h e
previous proposition, a nominal devaluation improves the terms of trade.
This is an important property of our model. Typically, PTM-LCP models
predict a negative correlation between the terms of trade and the nominal
exchange rate (improvement). On the other hand, PCP models predict that
the correlation between these two variables is one (worsening).
6 Flexible price equilibrium
In a ﬂexible price scenario wages are set after the realization of the shocks.
In this case, the optimal wage rate is given by,
Wt = ΦWζtµt
Clearly, a negative real shock (an increase ζt) and/or a expansionary
monetary shock will rise the nominal wage.




























In general, the real exchange rate will divert from 1. This implies that
even under ﬂexible prices there is no full risk sharing in consumption across
countries. In general, a positive real shocks (a fall in ζt)w i l ld e p r e c i a t et h e
equilibrium real exchange rate by making domestic labor relatively cheaper
with respect to the foreign one. At the same time, for any given γ∗ the
relationship between openness and real exchange rate is ambiguous. A more
open economy will have a more depreciated real exchange rate only if ζt >
ζ∗
t/α.













































23Basically, the more productive is a country in the good in which it has
comparative advantages, the worse are its terms of trade in equilibrium. At
the same time, the more open is an economy the lower are its terms of trade
in equilibrium.
7 Monetary Regimes
In this section we consider two diﬀerent monetary rules and we analyze the
incentives the central bank has to pursue a discretionary policy. In the
ﬁrst regime, the central bank adjusts the monetary stance in response to
foreign monetary innovations. This regime can be interpreted as a managed
exchange rate regime. In the second regime the central bank reacts only to
domestic real shocks. The exchange rate, in this case, will ﬂuctuate together
with domestic and foreign real shocks.
7.1 Managed exchange rate
Consider a rule for the domestic monetary policy, where the domestic mon-
etary policy stance is set proportional to the foreign monetary stance:
µt = δtµ∗
t
Clearly, this rule implies that the nominal exchange rate is ﬁxed at a
particular level δt:
Et = δt (27)
In the context of a PTM framework, Engel (2002) proposed such a rule
in order to deliver full consumption risk sharing across countries. In his
particular framework he proposed to set, ex-post, Et = Pt
P∗
t . The mone-
tary authority is able to do this because in the PTM framework prices are
predetermined.
In our case, it is not possible to have full risk sharing unless the number of






=1 . If that is the case, then full risk sharing could be
reached if the central bank chooses δt = Wt
W∗
t .A si nt h ePTM model, this is
possible because nominal wages are predetermined.















24Thus, the precise allocation will depend on the policy followed by the
monetary authority abroad. However, this allocation does not depend on
the degree of openness or the pass-through.
An important drawback of this policy is that domestic nominal magni-
tudes are undetermined. Any wage set by workers will be validated ex-post
by the central bank in order to keep the rule. Again, this is independent of
the pass-through and it is the result of the wage setting in the model.
7.2 Inward policy rule










where Ψ and Ψ∗ are two parameters.
This rule has been put forward by Corsetti and Pessenti (2001b). Under
this rule the central bank moves the monetary stance in a pro-cyclical way:
it expands nominal expenditure in response to a positive productivity shock
(low ζt) and contract nominal expenditure when productivity is low (high
ζt). Notice that this policy rule is an inward-looking rule. The central bank
does not adjust the monetary stance in response to any foreign innovation.
It is easy to show that if monetary authorities in both countries follow
this inward-looking rule then the equilibrium outcome coincides with the
outcome that would result if wages were ﬂexible. To see this, just replace
(28) into the wage equations (39) and (40). Under this rule the nominal





Therefore, the volatility of this variable will depend exclusively on the
correlation between domestic and foreign real shocks.
It is important to remark that this result is in sharp contrast with some
results in previous model for open economies with imperfect pass-through
(Devereux and Engel 2000, Engel 2002). In general, the source of nominal
stickiness and the reason why the pass-through is incomplete in those models
coincide: after a shock ﬁrms can not adjust their export prices. This is
way the ﬂexible price allocation in those models can not be reached. In
our case, imperfect pass-through arise independently form the source of
stickiness. Then, even in a context of imperfect pass-through the ﬂexible
price allocation can be reached with the proper monetary policy.
257.3 Inﬂationary bias under discretion
We just saw that if both domestic and foreign central banks follow and
inward-looking monetary rule then the equilibrium outcome coincides with
the ﬂexible price allocation. In this sub-section we analyze whether the
central bank has incentives to deviate in the short run from that particular
rule -or any other rule-. In other words, we analyze whether the central
bank has incentives to pursue a discretionary monetary policy.
In an open economy it is not obvious that an expansive monetary shock
increases welfare. One the one hand, because of monopolistic distortions
in both labor market and goods markets, the nominal wage and the price
of goods exceed labor marginal disutility and marginal cost, respectively.13
Therefore, output and consumption of domestic goods are suboptimally low.
In presence of nominal rigidities a small expansive monetary shock may
rise output and consumption of domestic goods. On the other hand, an
expansive monetary shock induces a nominal depreciation that may worsen
the terms of trade, and reduce the purchasing power of domestic agent’s
income.
Suppose the economy starts at the steady-state. We characterized such
a steady-state by assuming that disutility and monetary shocks satisfy: ζ =
ζ∗,a n dµ = µ∗. If a monetary shock that boosts demand increases welfare,
then under discretion the central bank will be biased towards pursuing an
expansive policy. In other words there would exist an inﬂationary bias in
the policy.







αa =1 . We also assume that the steady-state markup in
each market for each country are the same, and that the degree of openness of
each economy are symmetric. These assumption just alter certain threshold
parameters deﬁned below but do not change qualitatively the results.
As a welfare criteria we utilize the non-monetary utility of the represen-
tative households, deﬁned as e Ut =l o gCt−ζlt.D i ﬀerentiating this expression
around the steady-state we obtain,
de Ut = b Ct − ζlb lt (29)
where l= 1
ζΦNΦW is the steady state level of labor and where b Ct and b lt are the
log-linear deviation of consumption and labor with respect to their steady-
state level, respectively.
13Notice that real wages could be suboptimally to high or to low. If ΦN > ΦW then
real wages are suboptimally low.
26Under the previous assumptions the log-deviation of consumption is
given by the following expression:




where b Et = b µt − b µ∗
t. Here, we have utilized the fact that in the short run
wages are ﬁxed and, therefore, their log-deviations from the steady state are
zero.
A positive monetary shock as a direct impact on consumption by ex-
panding aggregate demand. However, a monetary shock also produces a
nominal depreciation that moves demand away from domestically produced
goods — expenditure switching eﬀect — . This eﬀect is larger the more open
is the economy. In the limiting case, when γ =1the elasticity of consump-
tion with respect to a domestic monetary shocks is equal to 1/2.I n t h i s
case, domestic consumption will also respond to foreign monetary shocks
with the same elasticity. On the other extreme, when γ −→ 0, consumption
responds only to domestic monetary shocks with an elasticity equal to 1.
In this case there is no expenditure switching eﬀect and ﬂuctuations in the
nominal exchange rate have no impact on domestic consumption.
The log-linear version of domestic labor can be expressed as follows:
b lt =( N − 2)(1 − γ)γb Et + b µt (31)
There are two eﬀect of a monetary shock on labor: (i) An expansive
monetary shock boost aggregate demand, and as a result output and labor
in all sectors rise. (ii) At the same time, the nominal depreciation of the
exchange rate, associated with the monetary expansion, changes the relative
participation of domestic and foreign ﬁrms in each market. In this case, the
eﬀect monetary shock is a non-linear function of γ.I f γ is large then the
elasticity of the markup of domestic ﬁrms with respect to the exchange rate
is also large. Then the market share of domestic ﬁr m si sv e r ys e n s i b l et o
changes in the nominal exchange rate. However, a large γ also means that
the proportion of domestic ﬁrms producing good b is low. Therefore, the
expansion in employment is not so large.
The next proposition characterizes and summarizes the impact of a do-
mestic monetary shock on domestic welfare. Let us ﬁrst deﬁne the following
threshold parameter: Γ =
(N−2)+ΦWΦN
4(N−2)1/2(ΦWΦN−1)1/2.




2 and Γ < 1 then for any γ an expansive





2 and Γ > 1 then there exist two values γ,γ ∈ (0,1) with




an expansive monetary shock decreases
domestic welfare.




2 then there exists a
unique e γ ∈ (0,1) such that for any γ<e γ an expansive monetary shock
increases domestic welfare.
When both economies are fully specialized the exchange rate pass-through
is complete and the gains, in terms of welfare, associated with a monetary
shock are 1/2. However, a monetary shock also raises labor eﬀort. When
both economies are fully specialized the disutility associated with this in-
crease in labor eﬀort is 1
ΦN
1




2 and economies are
fully specialized then a monetary shock unambiguously lowers welfare. In
this case ΦN and ΦW are relatively low which means that the economy is
operating close to the level of employment that is socially optimal. Then, if
the economy is completely specialized a monetary expansion lowers welfare.




2. In this case, goods and labor markets
distortions are large. Then policies that boost aggregate demand move the
economy closer to the eﬃcient production with lower real wages and more
output and employment. This is a well known result from the analysis of
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) among others.
When γ decreases the response of consumption to a given monetary shock
rises. On the other hand, the magnitude of the response of labor — and the
associated labor eﬀort disutility — ﬁr s tr i s e sa n dt h e ni tf a l l s . I nt h el i m i t
case when γ → 0 a monetary shock unambiguously increases welfare. This
is consistent with the results in Betts and Devereux (2000) who ﬁnd that the
degree of pass-through is crucial to pin down the eﬀect of a depreciation of
the exchange on domestic and foreign welfare.14 For intermediate values of
γ the impact of an expansive shock is ambiguous. For example, in case (b)
above either when the economy is very open or very close, domestic welfare
will increase following a monetary expansion. On the other hand, when
there are intermediate degrees of openness, monetary shocks may decrease
welfare in the line of Corsetti and Pesenti (2001b).
14These authors, by the assumption of perfect PTM, predict that a country terms of
trade improve when its currency depreciates. By the structure of our model, perfect PTM
(γ =0 )cannot be addressed but as a closed-economy solution
288C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we analyze the positive and normative implications of openness
for the transmission mechanism of monetary shocks. We develop a general
equilibrium monetary model where countries do not fully specialize accord-
ing to their comparative advantages. The degree of openness determines how
specialized is the country. With this framework we show that incomplete
specialization, in an oligopolistic environment, makes the pass-through from
exchange rate to import prices imperfect. The less open is the country, the
lower is the pass-through from exchange rate to import prices. As a result,
purchasing power parity (PPP) does not longer holds and real exchange rate
ﬂuctuations in response to monetary shocks depend on the degree of open-
ness of the country. At the same time, the correlation between the terms of
trade and the exchange rate can be positive or negative depending also on
the degree of openness of the country and its trade partners.
We analyze two alternative monetary regimes and investigate whether
the monetary authority has incentives to deviate from policy rules. We
show that even in the presence of imperfect exchange rate pass-through, an
inward-looking monetary policy can replicate the ﬂexible price allocation.
At the same time, we show that for intermediate degrees of openness the
incentives to pursue a discretionary expansive monetary policy are reduced.
29Table 3: Flexible Price Equilibrium Allocation
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34Appendix
Proof. Proposition 2.
The change in welfare (29) can be written as follows:




ΦWΦN (N − 2)γ (1 − γ),a n dw h e r eh a v e
used the fact that b Et = b µt.
Function Ω(γ) is of second order in γ. Notice that since ΦW, ΦN > 1
then Ω(0) > 0. In other words, if both economies are completely closed then
there are incentives to surprise agents and pursue an expansive monetary
policy. We are interested in analyzing how those incentives vary when the
degree of openness changes. Observe that when both economies are com-
pletely open Ω(1) = 1
2 − 1
ΦWΦN ≶ 0. Then, we can diﬀerentiate two cases:
(i) 1
2 > 1
ΦWΦN ;a n d( ii) 1
2 < 1
ΦWΦN .
Consider ﬁrst part (c) in proposition 2, where 1
2 < 1
ΦWΦN .T h i si m p l i e s
that Ω(1) < 0.S i n c e Ω(γ) is of second order and Ω(0) > 0, then there
must exist an e γ ∈ (0,1) such that ∀γ<e γ, Ω(γ) > 0.
Consider next parts (a) and (b) in proposition 2. In both cases we have
that 1
2 > 1
ΦWΦN . This implies that Ω(1) > 0. Then, the function Ω(γ)
can have zero, one, or two roots between 0 and 1. It is easy to see that if
(N−2)+ΦWΦN
4(N−2)1/2(ΦWΦN−1)1/2 > 1 then there are two roots. If
(N−2)+ΦWΦN
4(N−2)1/2(ΦWΦN−1)1/2 <
1 then there are no real roots. Finally, when
(N−2)+ΦWΦN
4(N−2)1/2(ΦWΦN−1)1/2 =1there
is only one root.
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